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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources
and media rms. Although empirically important, this channel for
supply-driven media bias has not previously been analyzed in eco-
nomics literature. We model the relationship as an informal contract
based on trust and punishment, where a news source decides if and
how much information to provide to a media rm. Strategic interac-
tions between these agents may have a signicant impact on the level
of media bias in the market. In particular, we show that in some cases
the news source provides information if and only if there is competi-
tion in the media market, while in other cases competition between
media rms reduces the amount of information that is made available
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1 Introduction
Private rms, government agencies and di¤erent types of interest groups of-
ten try to persuade media rms to withhold information which is to their
disadvantage. If successful, this implies that media rms deliberately pro-
vide the public with biased information. The reward to prot-maximizing
media rms for engaging in such behavior ranges from pure monetary grants
and purchase of advertising space to more indirect benets like access to
commercially valuable news stories.1 The existing literature on media eco-
nomics shows that competition might reduce such media bias.2 Apparently,
this is quite obvious. While a media rm with monopoly power may have
little to lose from holding back information, competition induces business-
stealing e¤ects which could make such a strategy unprotable. Washington
Post might for instance capture readers from New York Times (NYT) if they
report information which is highly appreciated by the public, but lose readers
if the information instead is published by NYT.
Political scientists estimate that between half and three-quarters of po-
litical news originate from news sources (Sigal, 1999, and Manning, 2001).3
However, the media economics literature has barely analyzed the importance
of news sources at all. The purpose of the present article is to open up this
research eld. We show that incorporating news sources in formal analysis
sheds new light on why news is published and how much information is with-
held, and that some conclusions in the existing literature are reversed. For
example, we nd that competition may increase media bias.4
1See e.g. Besley and Prat (2006) for a discussion of persuasive tools used by gov-
ernments, and see Ellman and Germano (2009) for examples of how advertisers might
inuence media bias in advertising-nanced media rms. For empirical evidence, see for
instance Strömberg (2001, 2004a,b) and George and Waldfogel (2003).
2We focus on supply-driven forces. The supply side channels rest on the journalists
private information (Baron, 2006), media capture by interest groups (Besley and Prat,
2006) and advertiserspressure (Gabszewicz et al., 2001). In all these cases, competition
reduces media bias.
3This dependence seems to have increased over the last years, since crises in the media
sector have forced sta¤ cuts in news organizations and a reduction in the time and money
allocated to investigative reporting (Gans, 1999; Manning, 2001; Berkowitz, 2009; Dinan
and Miller, 2009; Entman et al., 2009; Couldry, 2010 and Phillips, 2010).
4Note that we focus on the supply side, and do not investigate the media bias that
is demand-driven and based on the consumersprior beliefs. As shown in Mullainathan
and Shleifer (2005), competition in such a setting can lead to a larger media bias. The
idea is that if consumers incur a disutility cost if they read news that goes against their
2
SNF Working Paper No 21/12
Building on a framework developed by Klein and Le­ er (1981), we model
the relationship between media rms and news sources as tacit contracts in a
repeated game. This seems like a reasonable approach, since the relationship
between input suppliers and producers in the news market is usually based
on informal agreements and unwritten rules. For instance, Gans (1999) de-
scribes the interaction between news sources and journalists as a "tug of
war". According to him, "while news sources try to manage the news,
putting the best light on themselves, journalists concurrently managethe
sources in order to extract the information they want".
In the same vein, Manning (2001) describes the relation between spin
doctors - public relation o¢ cers hired by e.g. political organizations - and
journalists in the following way:5 "the crucial art for a spin doctor is to
understand how to bargain with information: how much to release, when it
should be released to optimize its value and what can be secured in return for
the release of information. Journalists will value those press o¢ cers whom
they come to trust su¢ ciently to bounce ideas o¤ or "try out" new inter-
pretations of developments. Although there are never any guarantees, spin
doctors may hope that if journalists come to regard them as useful sources of
insiderinformation, in return journalists may acknowledge certain obliga-
tions regarding the way in which they construct their copy". For this reason
Sigelman (1999) also argues that the key to understanding media bias, in
what concerns news sources and media rms, lies "not in conspiracies but in
cooperation and shared satisfaction".
In our model we have a news source which might supply information to a
media rm, but the source has a strong opinion about how much and what
kind of information that should be published. The media rm is aware of this,
and knows that if it publishes something that the news source dislikes, then
the source might stop supplying information. If the media rm adjusts to
the preferences of the news source, on the other hand, it expects to receive
valuable information in the future. We assume that both parties involved
prior beliefs, then news rms have incentives to slant news to consumersideological pref-
erences. By reporting news that is more extreme than the preferences of the audience,
they di¤erentiate themselves from the rivals and thereby dampen competition. See also
discussions in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006, 2008).
5Spin doctors are a special type of news sources, who develop spin for the clients
they represent. Spin is a form of propaganda campaign in the media developed with the
objective to persuade public opinion. Governments, private rms and other organizations
or public gures are usually represented in the media by spin doctors.
3
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in the relationship (the news source and the media rm) are aware of this
informal agreement. This captures what Gans (1999) characterized as a tug
of warbetween news sources and media rms, and it is also perfectly in line
with the spin doctor story discussed by Manning (2001).
We start out by considering a news source that can provide information
to a monopoly media rm. Since the news source is the one that decides to
reveal information, it is natural to assume that it can also propose how much
information the media rm should publish. However, once the media rm
gets a lead, it will have access to information such that it has the option to
publish more than the source prefers. We assume that the media consumers
are news hungry. Thus, the more information the media rm publishes, the
more it will enlarge the size of the market, and the greater will the size of
its audience be. Prot-maximizing media rms consequently face a trade-o¤
between supplying more information than the source prefers in the present
period versus receiving a ow of news from the source in the future. The
source is aware of this trade-o¤, and knows that if the media rm is allowed
to publish a su¢ ciently large amount of information, then it will not have
incentives to deviate. The problem is that the critical amount of information
which prevents the media rm from deviating might be so large that the
source is better o¤ if no information is published at all. If this is the case,
no information will be revealed in equilibrium. Otherwise there will exist
a collaborative equilibrium, where the published information on average is
favorable for the source.
We apply our model to investigate the consequences of competition be-
tween media rms, let us say two newspapers. In contrast to the existing
literature, we nd that competition can lead to more media bias. To un-
derstand why, consider the case where the news source nds it benecial to
provide information to a monopoly newspaper, but must allow it to publish
more than the sourcess rst-best choice. Suppose now that there is a change
from monopoly to duopoly in the media market. Then the opportunity cost
for the earlier monopoly media rm of not publishing the story might in-
crease. This is so for two reasons. First, by publishing the story, it can
capture readers from its rival in addition to enlarging the size of the market.
Second, if it does not publish the story, then the rival might do it. If so, it
will loose some of its existing readers, particularly if the readers perceive the
newspapers as relatively close substitutes. The news source can exploit these
business-stealing e¤ects, and request that the earlier monopolist publishes
less information than it would do if the rival had not entered the market.
4
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Thus, media bias has increased due to competition in the newspaper market.
Note that the strategic behavior of the news source is decisive for this result:
with a passive news source we would have the standard result described in
the example above, where competition between NYT and Washington Post
reduces media bias.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
review the related literature on media sources, media bias and media plural-
ity. In section 3, we introduce the basic model. In section 4 we analyze the
market outcome with monopoly in the media market, while we in section 5
analyze the market outcome with a duopoly in the media market. We o¤er
some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
While the economics literature on media bias has largely ignored the im-
portance of news sources, they have received a lot of attention in politi-
cal science. The main idea that comes from political science literature is
that news sources and newspapers are tied together by informal contracts.
This is so since the relation between media sources and newspapers tends to
be based on the grounds of exchange and negotiation (Ericson et al., 1999
and Manning, 2001), trust (Golding and Elliot, 1999 and Schlesinger, 1999),
punishment and threats (Molotch and Lester, 1999) and condentiality and
secrecy (Ericson et al., 1999). We review these arguments next.
The relationship between news sources and journalists is described by
political scientists as a non-economic "exchange relationship", because each
side recognizes certain (unwritten) rights and obligations (Manning, 2001).
For instance, journalists expect that news sources "understand the criteria
dening good copy, the importance of speed and accuracy in responding to
inquires, the value of an exclusiveto individual journalists and the nature
of intelligence or contextual information". Trust plays an important role,
and a newspaper that publishes untruthful news loses credibility, and this
can reduce the newspaper circulation (Soloski, 1999). In other words, media
organizations prefer to work with sources that guarantee communication of
true facts on a regular basis. In return, news sources expect that journalists
"will write balanced accounts which at least acknowledge their point of view"
and "listen to suggestions put to them for particular news items or features".
Since informal contracts agreed between news sources and journalists are
5
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wide-spread, political scientists argue that punishments and threats play a
central role in maintaining the relationship. Evidence shows that when a
news source proves not to be trustful and provides too inaccurate, false or
uninteresting information, the newspaper tends to drop this informant (Man-
ning, 2001). Similarly, when a journalist or a newspaper constantly gives a
non-favorable view of a given source, the source will also tend to stop passing
information to the newspaper (Gans, 1999 and Manning, 2001). Even when
the rupture is not at sight, powerful sources try to inuence journalistscov-
erage with threats (see Molotch and Lester, 1999). Some of these sanctions
are direct (like advertising boycotts or anti-trust suits) some are more subtle
(like journalism awards or leaks that reward collaboration).6
Another argument that surfaces in the political science literature, is that
since journalists have the right to protect the identity of their sources, the
problem of media bias may become much more blurred than one would other-
wise expect. In fact, even in court a journalist can deny to disclose informa-
tion provided by sources, due to professional condentiality issues. The most
well-known example involving the secrecy of news sources is the anonymous
source for the Watergate scandal (nicknamed Deep Throat). Only in 2005
(thirty years after the scandal surfaced), the source was revealed as William
Mark Felt, Sr., the former Deputy Director of the FBI.
Contrary to the political science literature, the economics literature is
sparse on the role of news sources and media bias. Three notable exceptions
are the theoretical works of Baron (2005) and Ellman and Germano (2009),
and the empirical exercise of Dyck and Zingales (2003).
In Baron (2005) two media sources (activists and industry) compete to
have their views passed on to the public via newspapers. In this sense, the
media sources can be seen as interest groups. The two interest groups/media
sources have opposing views: activists are in favor of regulation of an ex-
ternality and industry is against it. Therefore, the sources have incentives
to conceal information that goes against their views. Knowing this, media
rms can also undertake private investigation to obtain more information.
At the heart of Barons (2005) approach is an issue of journalistsprivate
information (see also Baron, 2006). Since the function of the media sector is
to serve the public, he assumes that the news rms tend to favor the views
6For instance, Molotch and Lester (1999) point out that all television networks in the
US have abandoned the custom of instant analysisof presidential speeches after pressure
from the White House.
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of the activists. As a result, only the activists conceal information.
Ellman and Germano (2009) model a two-sided market where media rms
are advertising-nanced. They show that a monopoly media rm will tend to
under-report news that reduces advertisersprot. With competing newspa-
pers, they nd that increasing the role of advertising will eventually induce
maximal accuracy. In line with our approach, they allow the advertisers to
withdraw advertising from papers that report too accurately on sensitive top-
ics. They show that such a strategy might restore the media bias, but it will
never lead to more media bias than with a monopoly media rm. In contrast,
we nd that competition between media rms might lead to a larger media
bias than with a monopoly media rm. The di¤erence stems from the way
we model the news provided by the news source. We assume that the news
source o¤ers a scoop that may increase the circulation of the media rms
product (say newspaper), and thereby reduce the circulation of the rival me-
dia rmsproduct. In this respect our model is more suited for analyzing the
role as such of a genuine news sources provision of information, for example
a police department that can provide a steady stream of information, while
Ellman and Germano (2009) are more suited for analyzing how advertisers
threat of withdrawal of advertising can inuence the news coverage as such.
Dyck and Zingales (2003) have a di¤erent focus, and investigate empiri-
cally the connection between journalism and asset prices. In particular, they
explain how media bias may stem from the relation between news sources
and journalists on reporting assets prices . Their main hypothesis is that in
order to induce a source to reveal information, the journalists have incentives
to give a positive spin to the sources views. Dyck and Zingales (2003) nd
evidence that this positive spin tends to be greater when there is a high de-
mand for the information and there are no alternative sources of information.
In contrast to Baron and Dyck and Zingales, though, we present a new cause
of media bias not yet identied in the economics literature: the informal
nature of the relationship between newspapers and news sources.
3 The Model
Let us consider a model with three types of agents: media rms, consumers
and a news source. In this section we consider a monopoly media rm, and
to x ideas we call it a newspaper. The source has access to information that
it can bring forward to the newspaper, and which can be characterized as a
7
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scoop. Let V denote the full set of information behind the scoop, and let the
measure of the information set be v : In the same vain, let V  V denote the
set of information that the newspaper actually prints, with measure equal to
v:
Like Besley and Prat (2006) we assume that only veriable information
can be printed. Thus, it would be useless for the source (or the newspaper)
to try to fabricate news. We further follow Besley and Prat in assuming
that the source has incentives to manipulate news by concealing part of the
information; rst-best for the source is that only information which is to
the benet of itself is published. The extent to which it succeeds with this,
determines how biased news the readers will be exposed for.
It is useful to order the elements in V such that they are decreasing in the
marginal benet (MB) of being published from the sources point of view.
Information which the source would like not to be published has MB < 0:
For reasons which will become clear below, we assume that if the newspaper
prints only a subset of V ; then it prints the information which has the highest
MB for the source:
An example of a relevant information set is illustrated in Figure 1, where
MB is positive until V = V . Here the sources benet, B(V ); is maximized.
For V > V  the sources marginal benet of seeing more information being
published is negative, but the total benet is still positive in the neighborhood
of V . However, if the newspaper prints so much information that V > V ,
then the source would have been better o¤ if no information were published
at all (B(V ) = 0). The general point is that there must be certain facts that
the source does not want to be revealed if it tries to ensure that the newspaper
prints less than V : For the sake of the argument we shall assume that the
total benet to the source of publication is negative for su¢ ciently high values
of V: Like Dyck and Zingales (2003) we label any deviation between V and
what is actually published as media bias, with measure equal to b = v   v.7
7Implicitly, it is thus assumed that rational consumers get a more unbiased picture the
greater the set of (truthful) information they receive. It could be argued that this need
not be true, in particular if v 2 (0; v) ; since the newspaper then prints increasingly more
information that is benecial for the source. Like Dyck and Zingales (2003) we sidestep
this issue. This is partly because we want to hold on to the terminology in the established
media bias literature, and party because in equilibrium we always have v 2 (v; v) : For
our purpose we might thus say that an increase in v makes the information picture more
"balanced", such that media bias is reduced.
8
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Figure 1: The sources benet from published information.
The newspapers circulation increases if it prints at least a minimum set of
information, Vmin (with measure vmin). Let DR denote demand for a regular
newspaper edition, and let DS > 0 denote the additional demand that the
newspaper observes if it publishes v > vmin. The consumers prefer more
news to less news, such that the more information the newspaper prints from
the scoop, the greater the additional demand; D0S(v) > 0: For concreteness,
we follow Dyck and Zingales (2003) in assuming that the newspaper expects
demand to increase by  copies if the whole set of information is printed (
represents the intrinsic value of the scoop), but that the demand expansion
is reduced by  > 0 copies for each unit of information that is concealed. We
thus have8
DS =   b > 0 for v > vmin, (1)
where  is higher the stronger is the readersdemand for information. Other
things equal, a given media bias (b > 0) will thus dampen newspaper circu-
lation more the higher is :
If it were costly for the newspaper to uncover the whole truth, it could
trivially be true that v < v. To avoid this uninteresting scenario, we assume
that once the newspaper has established a relationship with the source, it has
8In a similare manner, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) assume that a (truth-seeking)
readers utility equals u > 0 with unbiased news, but that the utility falls by 	 > 0 units
for each unit increased media bias.
9
SNF Working Paper No 21/12
full information about the scoop (so that it is able to publish v if it wants to).
The media literature on news sources discusses at least two channels through
which this might occur (see Manning, 1999). First, it is quite common that
sources reveal more information than what they wish to see printed. This can
be so because sources need to signal to newspapers that the information they
transmit is truthful, or they need to frame the story to give a full picture
of the issues involved. In such cases the source might transmit v to the
newspaper, but requests that only v < v is published.9 Second, journalists
can use the information they receive from a source as a lead to collect more
information by (for our purpose) costless private investigation. We might
then imagine that the source only reveals v < v, but that this gives the
newspaper a clue such that it can gather v > v.
We model the relationship between the source and the newspaper as a
repeated game, inspired by modelling rst introduced in Klein and Le­ er
(1981). The idea is that when a source and a newspaper collaborate, they
act in accordance with an implicit long-term contract. With this informal
contract it is common knowledge for the newspaper and the source that the
latter collaborates in the future (i.e.: continues to give information) only if
the newspaper publishes no more than what the source prefers.
The newspaper does not have any knowledge of the relevant story without
any information from the source. We thus assume that the source is the agent
that has control over the information. In line with this, we give the source the
power at stage 1 of the game to decide whether it should provide information
to the newspaper and also to propose how much information the newspaper
may publish. If it provides information, it sets v = vS as the information
the newspaper is asked to publish.10 At stage 2 the newspaper knows the
full information of the scoop, and decides whether it will follow the sources
request of publishing vS or whether it will deviate. The two-stage game is
repeated an innite number of periods.
We assume that the source uses a trigger strategy in the repeated game.
9In this respect, a press o¢ cer of a large union in England is quoted in Manning
(1999): "so in order to convince the journalists that they were getting something that was
important for them, we provided additional information from other areas as well... and we
service the history very thoroughly. Now the unwritten rule is that the person will help
me in other stories as well".
10Due to the way in which we have ordered the elements in the information set, vS is
measured from point 0 to point V S : Loosely speaking, it is the elements

0; 1; ; V S
	
that
the source asks the newspaper to publish.
10
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If it observes that the newspaper in the previous period published the re-
quested amount of information (vs), it continues to provide the newspaper
with information. If it observes that the newspaper deviated in the last pe-
riod, it stops providing information to the newspaper in this and all future
periods.
The relationship between the source and the newspaper is informal. This
means that there are no binding agreements; for instance, the source cannot
bring the newspaper to court if it publishes more than vS. Clearly, the
optimal strategy for the newspaper is therefore either to publish exactly the
information the source asks it to (vS) or to publish the complete scoop (v).
Publishing the whole truth increases demand in the present period, but at
the expense of any further collaboration with the news source in the future.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the newspaper does not incur
any marginal or xed costs of production, and we normalize the price of
the newspaper to 1. This means that the newspapers prot per period if it
collaborates with the source is R + S = DR + DS ; while it is otherwise
equal to R = DR.
4 Monopoly in the news sector
Using backward induction, we start out by solving the second stage of the
game. Given that the newspaper has received information from the source, it
must decide how much to publish. One option is to just publish vS, exactly
what the source has requested. The discounted prots for the newspaper
then equal
vS =
R+ b
1  , (2)
where  is the discount factor, with 0 <  < 1. The second option is to publish
the whole set of information (publish v). We dene this as a deviation, since
it implies that the newspaper publishes more that the sources proposal. In
this case the newspapers discounted value equals:
v = R + +

1 R. (3)
In the period where the newspaper deviates it receives a large payo¤, equal
to R+, while in all future periods it receives only the payo¤ from a regular
edition, R.
11
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It is protable for the newspaper to publish vS instead of v if vS  v:
Solving this inequality we nd that the newspaper must be allowed to print
so much information that b  bMon   :
Throughout the paper we consider v as xed, which means that the size of
the media bias is monotonically decreasing in the information that is provided
to the public (db=dvS < 0). Using that b = v   vS; it is then instructive to
express the condition for a cooperative equilibrium as
vS  vSMon  v    . (4)
If vS < vSMon, the monopoly newspaper will nd it more protable to
publish all information than to follow the sources request. This will be
rationally anticipated by the source, who consequently will not provide any
information at all. It is thus only for vS  vSMon that we might have an
equilibrium where the newspaper and the source collaborate. Let us rst
assume that this condition holds with equality:
Proposition 1 Suppose that there exists an equilibrium where the monopoly
newspaper publishes vS = vSMon. The set of published information is then
(i) decreasing in the intrinsic value of the news (),
(ii) decreasing in the newspapers valuation of the future (), and
(iii) increasing in the strength of the readers demand for information
().
The clue to seeing the intuition behind Proposition 1, is to note that
the source must allow the newspaper to publish so much information that
it will not deviate. If the news that the source can provide each period
has a high intrinsic value for the readers (high ), the demand expansion
will be large. Thus, the newspaper has a lot to gain from a long-lasting
relationship with the source, and will each period accept to print a relatively
small share of the information. In this sense the media bias will be greater
the more commercially valuable the sources information is. In the same
manner, the more patient the newspaper (high ), the less information it
will require to publish each period. However, if the readers have a strong
demand for information, the newspaper must be allowed to publish much
information today. Otherwise, it will have incentives to deviate in order to
increase present prots.
Next, let us consider stage 1 of the game. The source must decide whether
it will provide information, and if it does, how much information it will ask
12
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the newspaper to publish. Suppose rst that vSMon < v
: In this case the
source would actually like the newspaper to publish more information each
period than what is required to make the newspaper collaborate. It is then
straight forward to see that it will ask the newspaper to publish v, the
information that maximizes the sources benet from a publication (c.f. also
Figure 1). If v < vSMon < v
; on the other hand, the newspaper must be
allowed to publish more information than what is rst-best for the source.
This is necessary in order to encourage the newspaper not to publish all
the information. The optimal strategy will then be to ask the newspaper
to publish vSMon. Finally, if v
 < vSMon, there is no reason for the source
to contact the newspaper at all. The explanation is that to persuade the
newspaper not to publish the whole set of information in this case, it would
have to allow the newspaper to publish such a large share that the source
would be worse o¤ than if no information were published.
We can thus state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The optimal provision of information by the source is given
by:
(i) Regime 3: If vSMon  v; the source provides information and the
newspaper is asked to publish v.
(ii) Regime 2: If v < vSMon < v
, the source provides information and
the newspaper is asked to publish vMon.
(iii) Regime 1: If v < vSMon; the source decides not to provide any
information to the newspaper.
Note that the results in Proposition 1 relate to Regime 2, where the source
provides information and the critical value vSMon is the binding constraint.
Proposition 2 makes it clear that there is a non-monotonic relationship
between the critical value vSMon and the amount of information that is pub-
lished. To see why, assume that initially the critical value is so large that
the source prefers not to provide any information (Regime 1). Now, suppose
that due to changes in the nancial market, the newspaper starts to place a
greater value on the future (higher ). Then Proposition 1 tells us that vSMon
is reduced, and if the reduction is su¢ ciently large, it will suddenly become
optimal for the source to provide information to the newspaper (Regime 2).
As noted above, the intuition for this is that when the newspaper becomes
more patient, it is willing to sacrice publishing some information today in
exchange for receiving news from the source in the future. For the same
13
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reason, though, a reduction in the critical value will lower the set of infor-
mation being published if initially the newspaper prints a set of information
which corresponds to the critical value (i.e. if we are in Regime 2, where
v < vSMon < v
).
Figure 2 makes a graphical illustration of the same underlying mecha-
nisms, but here we consider the consequences of changing the strength of the
readersdemand for information (). So assume that we are in Regime 1
and that, for whatever reason, the readersdemand for information is weak-
ened (lower ). Then we move leftward in Figure 2. The Figure illustrates
that because a lower  reduces the critical value vSMon; a su¢ ciently large
reduction of  brings us from Regime 1 to the border of Regime 2, where
the source nds it protable to switch from not providing information to
providing information. However, a further weakening of the readersdemand
for information actually reduces the amount of information that the source
requests the newspaper to print in a collaborative equilibrium. This is true
until we enter Regime 1, where the value of  is irrelevant for the sources
request (B(V ) is maximized at V = V ): We therefore see that the initial
situation is crucial for whether changes in the characteristics of the industry
lead to more or less published information.
Figure 2: Optimal information provided by the source
Let us apply our model to consider the ability of media rms to change
consumers appreciation of information, which in turn might change their
14
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views. For instance, Herman and Chomsky (1998) argue that news agencies
and news rms are in the business of "manufacturing consent".
To see how manufacturing consent might work when we have a news
source, assume that the newspaper is able to add value to the information
it provides in such a way that the readersperceived value of a given set
of information increases from v to cv; with c > 1 (for instance through
the reporting style, see Herman and Chomsky, 1988). For simplicity, but
without a¤ecting the qualitative results, we assume that this is costless for
the newspaper. The newspaper now nds it protable to cooperate with the
source if
+[ (v cvS)]
1  >  + +

1  . (5)
Rearranging equation (5) for vS, we nd that in a collaborative equilib-
rium we must have
vS > vSCons 
1
c

v   


; (6)
where vSCons is the threshold level of information that promotes the newspaper
to cooperate with the source. Using equations (4) and (6) show that manufac-
turing consent reduces the minimum amount of information the newspaper
must be allowed to print in a collaborative equilibrium:
vSMon   vSCons =
c  1
c

v   


> 0. (7)
The intuition is quite straight forward. When the newspaper manipulates
the readersvaluation of the information it provides, it will be less protable
for the newspaper to deviate. The news source exploits this by asking the
newspaper to publish less information. This has the following implication:
Proposition 3 Assume that there is initially no manufacturing consent, and
that
(i) the source brings information to the newspaper, which prints vSMon.
Then a shift to manufacturing consent increases the media bias.
(ii) the source does not bring information to the newspaper. If vSMon >
v > vSCons, a shift to manufacturing consent will reduce media bias; v
S
Cons >
0 is being published instead of no information.
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Case (i) in the Proposition is in line with the results found in Herman
and Chomsky (1998). If media rms are able to change the readersper-
ception of the news, media bias tends to be higher. In contrast to Herman
and Chomsky, however, we nd that the driving force is the news sources
response to manufacturing consent. In case (ii) in the Proposition the result
is reversed. The starting point is a situation where the source does not nd
it protable to provide any information, because the minimum required to
ensure cooperation will make the source worse o¤. If the newspaper can en-
gage in manufacturing consent, this will also benet the source. The reason
is that it enables the source to provide less information than what it would
otherwise have to o¤er. This is exactly the case where the manufacturing
consent will change the news sources optimal behavior from not providing
to providing information. Paradoxically, the news source decides to reveal
information if it knows that the newspaper is able to manipulate the readers
valuation of the information.
5 Duopoly in the news sector
Let us now assume that we have two symmetric newspapers (an assump-
tion we shall later relax), and that the source can provide information to
at most one of them. The extent of competition between the newspapers
depends, inter alia, on how close substitutes the readers perceive them to be.
If the readers perceive the newspapers as close substitutes, we might expect
a signicant demand expansion for a newspaper that publishes a scoop and
a demand contraction for the other newspaper. To capture these business
stealing e¤ects, let D1 denote the increase in prots for a scoop-publishing
newspaper and D2 the reduction in prots if instead the rival publishes the
scoop. The larger is Di, i = 1; 2, the closer substitutes the newspapers are
from the readerspoint of view.
We assume, analogous to the previous section, that at the second stage of
the game a newspaper which has been contacted by the source must decide
how much information to reveal. If it publishes exactly what the source asks
it to publish, the source will continue the collaboration in the future. If
instead the newspaper publishes all the information it has about the news
scoop, it will not receive any information from the source in the future. On
the contrary, the source will then collaborate with the rival from the next
period on. We must thus reformulate the newspapers incentive constraint.
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The newspaper that has a relationship with the source in the present period
nds it protable to publish only what the source asks it to do if:
[+ (v vS)](1+D1)
1   ( + ) (1 +D1) + 1  (1 D2) . (8)
The left-hand side is the discounted value of collaborating with the source,
while the right-hand side is the discounted value of deviating by publishing
the whole set of information.
By rearranging equation (8) we nd that it is protable for the newspaper
to cooperate with the source if
vS  vSDuo  v  



1  1 D2
1 +D1

+ 



; (9)
where vSDuo is the minimum amount of information that the newspaper must
be allowed to publish in order to nd it protable to continue cooperating
with the source. Note that there is no business stealing e¤ect if D1 = D2 = 0,
in which case we have the same condition as in the previous section with a
monopoly newspaper.
The higher is D2 (the loss in sales if the rival publishes information from
the source in the future), the more expensive it is for the newspaper to
deviate and terminate the collaboration with the source. The critical value
vSDuo is therefore decreasing in D2: The relationship between D1 and v
S
Duo
is less clear-cut; on the one hand, the discounted value of collaborating is
increasing in D1. This is captured by the left-hand side of (8). However, on
the other hand, the demand-expanding e¤ect of deviating is also increasing
in D1; as is seen from the rst term on the right-hand side of (8). Intuitively,
we might expect that the latter e¤ect dominates. The reason for this is
that an increase in D1, similar to an increase in D2 ; should increases the
opportunity cost of not collaborating with the source. We therefore nd that
vS is decreasing in both D1 and D2 :
dvS
dD1
=  1 1 D2
 (D1 + 1)
2 < 0 and
dvS
dD2
=   1
 (D1 + 1)
< 0:
We then have the following result:
Proposition 4 Let us consider a duopoly in the newspaper market. The
tougher the competition from the rival newspaper, the less information the
source must allow the newspaper to print
 
@vSDuo=@D1 < 0 and @v
S
Duo=@D2 < 0

:
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As a corollary we might note that the critical information value is higher
under monopoly than under duopoly:
vSMon   vSDuo =



1  1 D2
1 +D1



> 0. (10)
Figure 3 sums up the consequences of competition in the newspaper sec-
tor. The solid lines in the Figure illustrate a monopoly newspapers incentive
to deviate from the informal contract with the news source: the benet in
the present period from deviating is given by the area GAIN, but prots in
the future periods are reduced by the area LOSS.
The dotted lines in the Figure illustrate how the gains and losses change
due to competition from a rival newspaper. First, if D1 > 0; the newspaper
steals business from its rival by receiving and publishing information from
the source. This increases both the discounted value of collaborating with
the source and the value of deviating by publishing all information today.
The net e¤ect is to make it more protable for the newspaper to cooperate,
as seen above.
Second, if D2 > 0 the newspaper will incur a loss in the future if it does
not cooperate, since it will lose some of its baseline sales to the rival. This
further increases the newspapers incentives to cooperate with the source.
The source can exploit these stronger incentives by reducing the amount of
information that it allows the newspaper to print.
18
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Figure 3: The incentive to deviate.
At stage 1, the source must decide if and how much information to pro-
vide. As in the case of a monopoly newspaper, there will be three di¤erent
regimes. However, since vSMon > v
S
Duo the cuto¤ values between the regimes
will now be di¤erent. For example, if vSMon > v
 > vSDuo there will be
situations where the source will not provide any information if we have a
monopoly newspaper, but will provide it if there is a duopoly. This is due
to the business-stealing e¤ect, which means that both the gain from cooper-
ating and the loss from not cooperating could be larger for a duopolist than
for a monopolist. In a situation where the source would provide information
independent of whether there is competition in the newspaper market, on the
other hand, a duopolist would publish less information than a monopolist.
We have the following results:
Proposition 5 Let us consider the optimal provision of information by the
news source.
(i)If vSMon > v
 > vSDuo, information will be provided if and only if there
is competition in the newspaper market
(ii) If v  vSDuo < vSMon  v or vSDuo < v < vSMon  v, less in-
formation will be provided with than without competition in the newspaper
market
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(iii) If vSDuo < v
S
Mon  v or vSMon > vSDuo > v; the same amount of
information will be provided in duopoly and in monopoly in the newspaper
market.
Figure 4 summarizes the discussion so far. If the readersdemand for
information is su¢ ciently strong ( > 3); the source will not approach any
newspaper, because it knows that it cannot prevent the whole story from
being published. If the readers are somewhat less news hungry, a newspaper
is willing to conceal part of the information if there exists a rival to which the
source otherwise will give the information. This is true in the range 2 <  <
3; where we will see information disclosure if and only if there is competition
in the newspaper market. This result, which corresponds to Case (i) in
Proposition 5, may sound familiar from previous analysis of media economics.
However, the mechanisms di¤er from those in the existing literature. It is not
the decision by the newspaper per se that is decisive for the media bias, but
rather the news sources decision on how much information the newspaper
is allowed to publish. This di¤erence in mechanism is underscored by the
fact that for even lower values of ; competition might reduce the amount of
information which is disclosed. This is the case for 1 <  < 2 (case (ii) in
Proposition 5). We then see that only if the readersdemand for information
is su¢ ciently weak ( < 1) or su¢ ciently strong ( > 3) is the extent
of information disclosure independent of whether there is competition in the
newspaper market.
Figure 4: A comparision of monopoly and duopoly
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Let us now loosen up the assumption that the media rms are symmetric.
In general, we will then have to consider how each of the rmsprot will
be a¤ected by either own or rival publishing of the scoop. To be specic,
assume that the newspapers di¤er in the size of their circulations, and let
i = L;M represent the large (L) and the small (M) rm.
Clearly, a scoop publication may a¤ect a large and a small rm very
di¤erently. To capture this, letDi1 measure the increase in sales for newspaper
i due to own publishing of a scoop, and Di2 measure the loss in sales if the
scoop instead is published by the rival. Furthermore, let vSLDuo and v
SM
Duo
dene the critical values concerning provision of information to the large and
the small rm, respectively. The following result can now be derived from
equation (9):
Proposition 6 Assume that the media rms are asymmetric.
(i) If 1 D
M
2
1+DM1
>
1 DL2
1+DL1
, then vSLDuo > v
SM
Duo (su¢ cient and necessary condition)
(ii) If DM1 > D
L
1 and D
M
2 > D
L
2 , then v
SL
Duo > v
SM
Duo (su¢ cient condition).
Case (i) in the Proposition shows the necessary and su¢ cient condition
for a lower critical value for the small than for the large newspaper. If this
condition is met, it implies that the news source provides less information
if it collaborates with a small than with a large newspaper. Case (ii) shows
the corresponding su¢ cient condition. Arguably, this condition may be met
in many situations. If the small newspaper publishes the scoop, it might
observe a large increase in sales since it has a greater growth potential. The
rival, on the other hand, has a large circulation at the outset and might not
be able to increase sales as much in relative terms. If this is true, we have
DM1 > D
L
1 .
Moreover, it is natural to expect that if the small rm publishes the scoop,
the e¤ect on the large rms sales will be relatively smaller than vice versa.
This follows directly from proportionality; the larger rm is less a¤ected
by the small rm than the small from the large. If this is true, we have
DM2 > D
L
2 .
Considering the news sources decision at stage 1, we can now show:
Proposition 7 Assume that the su¢ cient conditions which ensure that vSLDuo >
vSMDuo are fullled, and that the news source initially does not provide any in-
formation. A su¢ ciently large increase in the asymmetry will then lead the
source to provide information to the small rm.
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Proposition 7 thus shows that if DM1 > D
L
1 and D
M
2 > D
L
2 ; then the
source will approach the small newspaper. This simply reects the fact that
the source will exploit the smaller rms strong incentives to publish the scoop
by providing relatively little information. Note that this implicitly assumes
that it does not matter for the source whether the scoop is published by the
larger or the smaller newspaper (or at least that the source does not have too
strong preferences for the larger newspaper). At the outset this might seem
dubious, but it is well known from the press history that if one newspaper
publishes a scoop, then it will as a general rule be more or less copied by rivals
within a short time period. Indeed, this is one of the big controversies in the
internet age; automatic aggregators like Google News are quick to copy and
spread news to a broader public from the media rms that originally run a
scoop. For news of more local interest, we likewise see that it typically does
not take long from a scoop is published by one newspaper until the same
story can be found on the competitors internet pages.
An important and interesting corollary from proposition 7, is that the
more asymmetric the media rms, the less information the source must allow
to be printed:
Corollary 1 Assume that the su¢ cient conditions which ensure that
vSLDuo > v
SM
Duo are fullled : Suppose that the source provides information to
the small rm and that vSLDuo is the binding constraint. The greater the asym-
metry between the newspapers, the less information the source will provide.
6 Some concluding remarks
Even though the majority of political news comes from informal sources, the
literature on media economics has neglected how they may a¤ect media bias
(Sigal, 1999, and Manning, 2001). In this paper we use insight from political
science, and model the relationship between media rms and news sources
as an informal contract in a repeated game. Based on observations made by
political scientists, we assume that the news source has strong preferences
with regard to howmuch information a media rm should publish. The media
rm, on the other hand, would like to publish as much audience-generating
information as possible.
Whether there exists a collaborative equilibrium between a news source
and a media rm clearly depends on the media rms valuation of the future.
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The more patient the rm is, the more willing it is to bias the information
that it provides to its audience. This is so simply because the protability of
maintaining a long-lasting relationship with the source to build up a larger
audience in the future is increasing in the discount rate. A high intrinsic
value of the news draws in the same direction, since it is more valuable for
the media rm to cooperate with the news source if it continuously provides
commercially valuable information. However, the stronger the audiences
demand for news, the more information the source must allow the media
rm to publish in order to ensure that it cooperates.
The existing literature typically predicts that competition in the media
market reduces supply-driven media bias. We show that this need not be the
case once we take into account the fact that news sources may be strategic
players. The intuition is that the opportunity cost for a media rm of not
publishing a story tends to increase if it faces competition, and the stronger
the business-stealing e¤ects, the more important it is for the rm to get the
story. The news source can take advantage of this, and persuade the media
rm with which it wants to collaborate to reduce publication of unfavorable
information. Thereby competition might increase media bias. However, pre-
cisely because competition increases a media rms willingness to accept the
news sources request to conceal certain information from its audience, there
also exist situations where a news story will be published if and only if there
is competition in the media market.
We further investigate the consequences of asymmetries between media
rms, for instance with respect to the size of their audiences. In theory
it is not clear whether the large or the small media rm has the strongest
incentives to cooperate with the news source. However, we argue that under
reasonable assumptions, it might be the small rm. This is the case if the
smaller rm has the larger potential for increasing the size of its market
by publishing news stories based on information from the source, and the
most to lose if instead it is the rival that collaborates with the source. If
so, the small rm will be more willing to obey the sources request not to
publish unfavorable information, and will therefore, other things equal, be
the preferred partner for the source. An interesting implication of this, is
that the more asymmetric the media rms are, the greater we might expect
supply-driven media bias to be.
Our study is relevant for news sources that can provide media rms with
a steady stream of news. This implies that institutions with potential for
long-term relationships with media rms, such as police departments, gov-
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ernment o¢ ces or private rms with a high public prole, can exploit the
mechanisms we have modelled and therefore be able to withhold information.
This is exactly what we observe that such institutions are doing, according
to the referred political science literature. Our study then calls for a more
detailed study of this mechanism, for example empirical evidence of whether
competition creates more or less source-induced media bias.
There are a number of issues that need to be further explored. In par-
ticular, the role of complementary supply and demand side forces for media
bias, such as media ownerspolitical preferences and readerspolitical priors,
should be studied. Another interesting research path would be to analyze
how the publication of a news scoop by one media rm a¤ects the rivals
incentives to invest in investigative journalism. These incentives might be
particularly strong if the rivals can reveal that the original publisher and
the news source have collaborated in hiding important information. In the
same vein, it is important to investigate the consequences of having more
than one news source in the market. This issue could be of great importance
when news sources have conicting objectives about what can be published.
Finally, given that the e¤ects of competition in the media market are substan-
tially di¤erent from those in conventional industries, further work should also
focus on the role of competition policy and regulation in the news market.
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News Sources and Media Bias
Armando J. Garcia-Pires
Hans Jarle Kind
Lars Sørgard
In this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources and media 
firms. Although empirically important, this channel for supply-driven media bias 
has not previously been analyzed in economics literature. We model the rela-
tionship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment, where a news 
source decides if and how much information to provide to a media firm. Strategic 
interactions between these agents may have a significant impact on the level of 
media bias in the market. In particular, we show that in some cases the news 
source provides information if and only if there is competition in the media mar-
ket, while in other cases competition between media firms reduces the amount 
of information that is made available to the audience.
